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W
e know that Virginia is heavily 
dependent upon defense spending – 
the Department of Defense (DOD) 
estimates that 11.8 percent of the value of the 
Commonwealth’s economic activity is contingent 
upon defense spending. This is the highest in the 
nation (Office of Economic Adjustment, DOD, 
2015).1 Direct defense spending in Virginia will 
exceed $64 billion in 2015 (The Washington 
Post, Aug. 23, 2015).2 To place this number 
in perspective, consider that Virginia’s state 
government spends approximately $46 billion 
annually.  
Further, in the federal government’s 2015 fiscal 
year, the DOD will have awarded at least $21.22 
billion in contracts to firms headquartered in the 
Commonwealth. Virginia ranks third nationally 
in terms of receiving the most defense contract 
awards (see Graph 1).  
Two regions of the state – Northern Virginia 
and Hampton Roads – dominate defense 
spending in Virginia and together account 
for about 86 percent of all DOD spending 
in the Commonwealth. DOD spending in 
Northern Virginia is considerably greater than 
in Hampton Roads and accounts for 70 percent 
of all DOD spending in Virginia, while Hampton 
Roads is responsible for about 16 percent 
(JLARC Report, June 2014).  
1   www.oea.gov/library/directory/defense-spending-by-state-fy14.
2   The DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment report for FY 2014 notes 
that DOD spending in Virginia in FY 2014 was only $54.7 billion. 
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GRAPH 1
TOP 10 STATES IN TERMS OF TOTAL DEFENSE CONTRACT AWARDS RECEIVED 
(IN BILLIONS OF $)
Source: www.usaspending.gov
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GRAPH 2
VIRGINIA’S U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS AND DOD CONTRACT, GRANT AND GIFT AWARD ACTIVITY IN THOSE DISTRICTS, FY 2014
Source: John G. Ownby, Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 5, 2015
Source: www.usaspending.gov
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Graph 2 provides two illustrations. The first is a map of Virginia’s U.S. 
congressional districts. The second is a pie chart showing the percentage 
of DOD contract awards made to firms and organizations in these districts 
during FY 2014.  
Congressional districts 8, 10 and 11 in Northern Virginia accounted for 61.2  
percent of all contract award activity in Virginia in FY 2014, while districts 
1, 2 and 3 in Hampton Roads were responsible for 31.7 percent of that 
activity. Critically, however, the economy of Hampton Roads is much less 
diversified than that of Northern Virginia. In 2014, more than 39 percent of 
all economic activity within Hampton Roads was related to DOD spending 
(The State of the Region report for Hampton Roads, 2015). This illustrates 
the vulnerability of Hampton Roads to defense spending reductions.
In 2014, an estimated 125,000 active-duty military members were 
stationed in Virginia and an estimated additional 90,000 civilians 
worked for the DOD within Virginia.3 Approximately 72 percent of the 
active-duty military personnel were located in Hampton Roads, primarily 
at several U.S. Navy facilities. We estimate that 50 percent of the 
Commonwealth’s civilian DOD employees are located in Northern Virginia, 
while almost 40 percent work in Hampton Roads. Reality is that despite the 
location of the Pentagon in Arlington, DOD activity in Northern Virginia is 
carried out predominantly via contractual relationships with private firms 
rather than at military installations.
These data easily demonstrate that the DOD spends large sums of money in 
Virginia and that the Commonwealth is one of the most important national 
locations for the DOD as well. 
3    These 2014 estimates came from DOD personnel who cannot be quoted. However, 2013 data are available by 
service at http://www.governing.com/gov-data/military-civilian-active-duty-employee-workforce-numbers-
by-state.html.
Sequestration
The bad economic news is that Department of Defense expenditures on 
both personnel and contracts have been declining and “sequestration” is 
a very important reason for this.4 Sequestration is the term used to refer 
to automatic spending cuts that have been built into federal government 
budgets by virtue of the Budget Control Act of 2011.  
One can see the impact of sequestration on DOD spending in Graph 3. Only 
“discretionary” DOD spending is reported in this graph; so-called “special 
operations” DOD spending for activities in areas such as Afghanistan and 
Iraq is not included. Discretionary DOD spending, then, represents the core 
DOD budget absent any items that Congress has declared to reflect special 
operational and one-time needs.  
The blue line in Graph 3 indicates what DOD spending would have been 
without any sequestration reductions. The red line depicts the level of DOD 
spending after the sequestration agreement. Discretionary defense spending 
was scheduled to decline by a total of $454 billion between FY 2013 and FY 
2021. Each individual year’s DOD spending would have been 8 percent to 10 
percent lower because of sequestration.
However, Congress agreed to sequestration relief in FY 2014 and FY 2015. 
The purple trapezoid in Graph 3 represents the amount of that relief, 
which totaled $31.6 billion for the DOD during the time period. This relief 
disappears in FY 2016 unless Congress reverses its current course.
If sequestration continues, then discretionary DOD spending will increase 
slightly in FY 2016 to $523.1 billion – only a 0.35 percent increase. Given 
the dependency of the Commonwealth’s economy on defense spending, it is 
understandable why Virginia recorded a zero real growth rate in 2014 and 
also why there is likely to be only modest economic growth in 2015 and 2016. 
4    For example, in Hampton Roads, DOD personnel expenditures declined 6.9 percent between 2010 and 2013 
even while nonfarm personnel expenditures were increasing 9.3 percent. (See The State of the Region 
report for Hampton Roads, 2015.) 
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GRAPH 3
SEQUESTRATION FUNDING CAPS, FY 2012 TO FY 2021
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Two Major Categories Of 
Defense Spending
The two major conduits for Department of Defense funds that come to 
Virginia are (1) expenditures made on personnel and (2) expenditures 
made via contracts negotiated by the DOD with private firms or other 
governmental units for construction, equipment, fuel, supplies, services, etc. 
In addition, the DOD makes loans and provides a variety of other kinds of 
financial assistance that may not fall directly into these two categories. We 
will focus initially on personnel costs.
DECLINING NUMBERS OF DOD PERSONNEL
The number of DOD personnel in Virginia – both active-duty and civilian – 
has been declining. Table 1 reveals that active-duty military employment 
in Virginia now is 30 percent below where it was in 1991.  
Let’s consider an instructive example. The aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford 
(CVN 78), a Huntington Ingalls project that will join the fleet in 2016, 
will cost $13.7 billion. Its crew will number 4,500, about 1,000 fewer than 
those serving on existing carriers.5 This underscores a distinct trend 
in defense spending – increasingly expensive, technology-rich assets 
such as aircraft carriers translate into a reduced ability to employ and 
support personnel. The tradeoff is straightforward: As the DOD expends 
increasing proportions of its budget on expensive ships, airplanes and 
technology, it inevitably finds that it cannot hire as many people. This 
means that the number of active-duty military personnel and DOD civilian 
employees must ineluctably decline until Congress is willing to spend more 
money.
In fact, the DOD has fewer dollars available to hire people today than 
in the past. This is an important reason why the number of active-duty 
military declined from 2.04 million in 1990 to only 1.35 million in 2014. The 
decline has been even more significant in the U.S. Navy. Active-duty naval 
personnel in 2014 were only about half the number in 1990.6 In defense-
5   www.naval-technology.com/projects/cvn-21.
6   http://historyinpieces.com/research/us-military-personnel-1954-2014.
heavy Hampton Roads, the most recent peak in the number of active-
duty military personnel occurred in 2003, when 113,400 men and women 
were deployed here. This number has declined every year since then to 
86,500 in 2013.
The deployment of superior new technology sometimes results in smaller 
numbers of individuals being needed to accomplish necessary tasks. As 
already noted, the crew of the Gerald R. Ford will number 1,000 fewer 
individuals than the crews of predecessor aircraft carriers, and the Navy 
attributes much of this to the incorporation of new technology into its 
physical structure and operations. It is a trend, however, that encompasses 
all of the military services.
DECLINING COMPENSATION
Even if the deployment of new technology were not a factor in reducing 
the number of active-duty military personnel, there is another trend that 
also has played an important role in the decline in DOD employment 
– the increasingly expensive compensation packages received by DOD 
personnel. Table 1 compares the compensation increases received by 
active-duty military personnel, other government personnel and private-
sector employees between 2001 and 2013. Because we have an all-volunteer 
military, the United States must offer compensation packages sufficient to 
attract and retain personnel. Important elements of these packages include 
housing allowances, health care coverage and pensions systems, all of which 
are attractive because of their mostly nontaxable status. One can see that 
between 2001 and 2010, total military employee compensation increased 
much more rapidly than either government or private-sector employee 
compensation. During this time period, total private, nonfarm compensation 
increased 38.5 percent, while military compensation increased 71.8 percent.  
After historically large increases in compensation between 2000 and 
2010, the total compensation earned by active-duty military personnel in 
the Commonwealth has been declining and fell 6.9 percent between 2010 
and 2013 (see Table 1).  
Total compensation is one thing; average compensation per employee 
is another. The data presented in Table 2 demonstrate the average 
compensation of active-duty military personnel has stalled; there was 
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only a 0.8 percent increase per individual between 2010 and 2013 and 
an actual 2.8 percent decline between 2012 and 2013. This contrasts 
visibly with the 3.3 percent increase in average federal civilian employee 
compensation and the 4.3 percent increase in the average compensation of 
private-sector nonfarm employees between 2010 and 2013. 
Here is the rub for Virginia. Holding other things constant, the 
increased compensation costs inherited from the previous decade and the 
DOD’s increased reliance upon more expensive assets such as aircraft 
carriers will result in fewer active-duty personnel at DOD installations 
throughout the Commonwealth. The same DOD dollar cannot be spent 
two places.  
TABLE 1
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL COMPENSATION (WAGES PLUS FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR MILITARY, 
FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYEES, 1991-2013
PERCENT CHANGE, 
1991-2000
PERCENT CHANGE, 
2001-2010
PERCENT CHANGE, 
2010-2013
PERCENT CHANGE, 
2012-2013
Military Employment -19.5% -9.0% -7.7% -0.6%
Military Compensation 5.3% 71.8% -6.9% -3.4%
Federal Government 
Civilian Employment
-11.8% 21.8% 1.2% -0.4%
Federal Government 
Civilian Compensation
27.0% 93.8% 4.5% -0.7%
Private Nonfarm Employment 26.7% 7.7% 4.1% 1.0%
Private Nonfarm 
Compensation
89.15% 38.5% 8.6% 1.9%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
DOD asset cost escalation is exemplified by the cost of top-of-the-line 
fighter aircraft. In 1945, the foremost U.S. fighter was the P-51 Mustang, 
which cost about $50,000 per copy to produce. In 2015 prices, this 
translates to $656,000. Compare this to the estimated $300 million-plus 
cost of a single new F-35C fighter in 2015. Of course, the two planes are 
in no way equivalent, but it is precisely the tremendous upgrading of such 
equipment that has accelerated procurement costs and reduced the funds 
available to support personnel.
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TABLE 2
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND AVERAGE COMPENSATION (WAGES PLUS FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR 
SELECTED EMPLOYEE CATEGORIES IN VIRGINIA, 2001-2013
EARNINGS IN 2001 EARNINGS IN 2012 EARNINGS IN 2013
PERCENT CHANGE, 
2001-2010
PERCENT CHANGE, 
2010-2013
PERCENT CHANGE, 
2012-2013
Military Active-Duty 
Employees
$47,536 $93,058 $90,500 88.9% 0.8% -2.8%
Federal Government 
Civilian Employees
$72,732   $120,022 $119,631 59.2% 3.3% -0.3%
State and Local 
Government 
Employees
$42,796 $59,086 $60,122 36.8% 2.7% 1.8%
Private Nonfarm 
Employees
$35,891 $47,644 $48,090  28.5% 4.3% 0.9%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
DOD CONTRACT AWARD ACTIVITY IN VIRGINIA
As Graph 1 disclosed, Virginia ranked third among the states in terms of 
the total annual volume of DOD contract awards received in FY 2015 to 
date. However, if anyone has been harboring doubts that DOD spending in 
Virginia has been on the decline, Graph 4 should erase such. It reports the 
total dollar value of all DOD contracts, grants, loans and other assistance to 
firms and organizations in Virginia, FY 2010 through FY 2015 to date. These 
awards declined 21.2 percent between FY 2011 and FY 2014.
DOD “TRANSACTIONS” IN VIRGINIA
DOD contracts for weapons, equipment, fuel, food, etc., often are less 
visible than personnel expenditures. Exceptions include the very large 
DOD contracts awarded to firms such as Huntington Ingalls relating to the 
construction or rehabilitation of aircraft carriers. These events justifiably 
garner considerable attention, but most other DOD contracts merit no more 
than a sentence in the business section of local publications. Even some large 
contracts occasionally float by without much notice. How many Virginians 
are aware of the $858 million contract for fuel that the DOD negotiated 
with Foster Fuels, which is located in the small town of Brookneal, south of 
Lynchburg?   
As Graph 5 indicates, DOD contracts made with firms and governmental 
units in Virginia, though below previous peak levels, still remain significant 
in number, not the least because after they are signed, they frequently are 
modified and extended. Such events are termed “transactions” and are 
commonplace. Despite their frequency and ultimate economic impact when 
considered as a whole, DOD transactions in Virginia seldom capture the 
public’s attention for extended periods of time.  
The total value of the DOD procurement contracts in Virginia metropolitan 
areas roughly mirrors the number of transactions, except for the Lynchburg 
metro area, which boasts the huge Foster Fuels contract. Let’s initially 
consider those contracts awarded outside of Northern Virginia and 
Hampton Roads. One can see in Graph 6 that in FY 2014, Lynchburg (with 
the Foster Fuels contract) and Richmond dominated the play. 
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A major lesson of Graph 6, however, is that virtually every metropolitan 
area in Virginia has a stake in DOD contractual procurement spending. 
Metropolitan areas such as Charlottesville, Lynchburg, Richmond and 
Roanoke all are substantial DOD participants in addition to Northern 
Virginia and Hampton Roads. Taking a longer view, however, this is both 
good and bad for Virginia. During the first decade of this century, our 
dependence on the DOD turned out to be very good for us, economically 
speaking, because defense spending was increasing rapidly. However, 
conditions became less salubrious for the Commonwealth in 2015 as a 
consequence of sequestration and stagnant or declining DOD spending.      
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GRAPH 4
DOD CONTRACTS, GRANTS, LOANS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE AWARDED TO FIRMS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN VIRGINIA, 
FY 2010 TO FY 2015 TO DATE
Source: www.usaspending.gov
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GRAPH 5
DOD CONTRACTUAL TRANSACTIONS IN VIRGINIA, FY 2010 TO FY 2015 TO DATE
Source: www.usaspending.gov
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GRAPH 6
DOD CONTRACTS AWARDED TO RECIPIENT METROPOLITAN AREAS OUTSIDE OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS, FY 2015 TO DATE 
Note:  Brookneal is an incorporated city within Campbell County in the Lynchburg Metropolitan Area.  
Source: www.usaspending.gov
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GRAPH 7
LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF DOD CONTRACT AWARDS IN VIRGINIA, FY 2014
Source: www.usaspending.gov
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Who Receives DOD 
Contracts In Virginia?
What companies and firms are actually receiving the Department of Defense 
contracts? Graph 7 supplies FY 2014 data to date for the Commonwealth. 
These numbers should be interpreted with care. While Huntington 
Ingalls easily is one of the largest DOD contract recipients, not all of the 
$2.838 billion of activity in FY 2015 actually relates to Newport News, the 
company’s headquarters. Some of these dollars may well have been spent in 
other locations. 
The money received by a firm headquartered in one city or county may 
be spent in another city or county, or even in another state. For example, 
approximately three-quarters of all employed individuals in Northern 
Virginia cross city or county lines when they commute to their jobs. Thus, 
DOD contractual spending tends to diffuse broadly across that region, and 
hence the information in Graph 7 should be regarded as guidance, not as 
gospel.  
There are two other things to bear in mind. First, the federal government’s 
fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and therefore cannot be compared to a calendar 
year. Second, many widely publicized DOD contracts involve multiple years’ 
activity. In June 2015, for example, Huntington Ingalls announced that it 
had received a $3.35 billion contract award for future work on the detail, 
design and construction of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier John F. 
Kennedy (CVN 79). The company also received a $941 million contract for 
modifications on existing construction on the ship. Work on the 100,000-ton 
John F. Kennedy began in 2011; it is scheduled to join the fleet in 2017. The 
lesson is that DOD contract expenditures in a specific fiscal year sometimes 
by themselves do not provide an accurate picture of the influence of DOD 
expenditures on economic activity.
Assessing The Future For 
Defense Spending In Virginia
In addition to sequestration, the rising cost of military assets and increased 
DOD employee costs, there are other things for Virginians to worry about 
where the future of defense spending in the Commonwealth is concerned. 
These include: (1) the refocusing of U.S. defense attention toward the Pacific 
Rim as a consequence of rising consideration being given to China; (2) risk 
factors associated with homeporting so many carriers in a single location, 
such as Norfolk; (3) questions whether aircraft carriers really are the most 
cost-effective assets the United States can deploy in a variety of combustible, 
confined naval situations and unconventional warfare situations around the 
world; (4) shifting DOD expenditure emphasis away from assets such as 
aircraft carriers and submarines, and toward activities involving drones and 
cyber warfare; and (5) rising sea levels that could make Naval Base Norfolk 
a comparatively less attractive place for the U.S. Navy.   
Of the five factors noted above, only Nos. 3 and 4 offer Virginia the possible 
prospect of increased defense spending, and those would occur because of 
defense spending shifting from Hampton Roads to Northern Virginia.  
With respect to No. 1, the refocusing of attention toward the Pacific Rim 
might well translate into the loss of an aircraft carrier group to the Pacific. 
Each aircraft carrier group has an economic impact of approximately $800 
million per year, so this is hardly a negligible consideration.  
Where No. 2 – homeporting – is concerned, both military and political 
factors could cause the Navy to move aircraft carriers out of Norfolk 
to locations such as Jacksonville. It would be expensive for the Navy to 
replicate the public- and private-sector facilities currently available in 
Hampton Roads, but perceived needs for disbursal of defense assets might 
eventually override those costs.   
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Nos. 3 and 4 overlap and eventually reduce to this question: Will emerging 
emphases on nonconventional warfare (including cyber warfare) and 
changing international weaponry make aircraft carriers a less effective way 
for the DOD to spend its limited dollars? China, for example, now boasts 
that it will deploy a “carrier-killer” missile (Charles Clover, Financial 
Times, Sept. 3, 2015). One can conceive of circumstances where Northern 
Virginia’s collection of private-sector and governmental talent might result 
in significantly increased DOD expenditures there and decreased DOD 
expenditures in Hampton Roads because of a de-emphasis on aircraft 
carriers and increased emphasis upon cyber warfare and related technology.
Rising sea levels, noted in No. 5, afflict the entire East Coast, but Hampton 
Roads more virulently than nearly all other regions because of its gradually 
sinking ground. At some point, the Navy might decide that it simply is too 
expensive to deal with these challenges in Hampton Roads and/or increase 
its investment in nonship assets as a result.
What’s the bottom line on the future of defense spending in Virginia? 
It is clear that the outlook for future DOD spending in Hampton Roads 
is not particularly favorable. However, Hampton Roads’ losses might 
translate into Northern Virginia’s gain. Increased emphasis upon 
cyber warfare, drone technology and unconventional warfare could fit 
Northern Virginia’s portfolio of strengths rather well. Northern Virginia 
already dominates DOD spending in Virginia and future developments 
may only increase that ascendancy. 
Summing It Up
One prominent Virginian, upon reviewing the list of the largest Department 
of Defense contract recipients provided in the previous graphs, exclaimed, 
“I’ve never heard of half of these companies.” He’s not the only one. Defense 
contracting is very big business in the Commonwealth, but much of it occurs 
outside of public and media scrutiny.  
While DOD activities in Virginia have been adversely affected by 
sequestration, our statewide numbers can be sensitive to the periodic 
awarding of large contracts to firms such as Foster Fuels or Huntington 
Ingalls. Year-to-year changes, therefore, sometimes can be deceptive.  
Even so, the post-sequestration trend in DOD spending in Virginia 
cannot be mistaken – it is constant or declining in most categories. As 
a consequence, it seems likely that the roster of DOD employees will 
continue to decline in Virginia, at least partially because the prices of 
major defense assets, such as aircraft carriers, continue to increase 
significantly and personnel costs have accelerated upward. The DOD 
simply does not have sufficient funds to purchase these expensive 
assets, compensate its current and former employees, and maintain 
its current active-duty numbers. Unless counteracted by sequestration 
spending relief or other intervening events, this new reality will exercise 
a noticeable drag on the Commonwealth’s economic growth for the 
remainder of this decade.  
